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The Restoration of Central Europe
Geza Jeszenszky
There was a British political writer, Scotus
Viator, who before 1918 was very popular in
Zagreb and in Dalmatia and who contributed a
great deal to the creation of a Greater Serbian
Yugoslavia. His son, Hugh Seton-Watson, became
a distinguished historian, who some 22 years ago
gave a series a lectures at the University of Wash-
ington in Seattle on the Danubian lands and said:
"Europe remains the heart of the human race and
the heart of Europe is sick.": Today people in Cen-
tral Europe certainly don't feel very well but they
are certainly better than they were in 1975. The
collapse of the Communist (internal and interna-
tional) system made curing possible, and although
the medicine is very bitter the doctors believe it
will work.
Under Communism Central Europe was
dying and was being forgotten. Applying the term
"Eastern Europe" to Czechoslovakia and Hun-
gary and the term "Balkans" to Croatia and
Slovenia was tantamount to acquiescence in So-
viet and Serbian domination of the Danubian
lands. But Central Europe had been too strongly
linked culturally to the West to be absorbed eas-
ily and its citizens made good use of the weaken-
ing of external and internal control, so when the
failure of the Communist utopia became mani-
fest in 1989 the political earthquake unearthed
and revealed our beautiful world of Central Eu-
rope. It was here, in the borderland between
Western Europe and the Russian heartland that
the post-Second World War period came to an
end and a new era in world history began. Thus
after 1918-1920and 1945-1947, 1989-1991became
the third historic turning point in the 20th cen-
tury. As a result the largely artificial federations:
the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslova-
kia, ceased to exist, many nations and states
emerged from decades or sometimes centuries of
oblivion. Parliaments became real centers of de-
bate and even power not only in such old, historic
European capitals like Prague, Zagreb or
Budapest, but also in new ones like Bratislava and
Ljubljana.
The present generation of politicians, ad-
visers and thinkers has the historic responsibility
to make the best of the great changes which oc-
curred between 1989 and 1991-2, in other words
to utilize the resounding victory won by our tradi-
tiona IEuropean values and principles, by the Euro-
Atlantic political, economic and social model. The
traditional mistake made by so many victors: to
win the war and to lose the peace, should be
avoided. Today the road is still open to restore
the historic frontiers of the western world as a
Euro-Atlantic community, with a chance to ex-
pand it eventually much further, one day perhaps
reaching the borders of China.
The Forgotten Europe
As we know it very well, but our friends in
Western Europe and on the other side of the At-
lantic know it far less, in the last two millenia the
lands between the Baltic and the Adriatic were
the borderland, the defense line of western civili-
zation. Here, at a historical fault line, two politi-
cal cultures (autocratic and pluralistic), three
major Christian traditions (Roman Catholic, Prot-
estant and Orthodox) and four linguistic groups
(Latin or Romance, Indo-German, Slav and
Finno-Ugrian) meet. A thousand years ago the
emerging new version of western civilization came
to incorporate the new Christian kingdoms of
Poland, Bohemia, Hungary and Croatia. (As it is
again not widely known by people in the West
Bulgaria, the Kievan Rus and Serbia were con-
verted to Christianity by "the second Rome",
Byzantium, adopted the Cyrillic alphabet, and
came to develop along different cultural and po-
litical patterns.) Although centuries later the in-
dependence of these countries was destroyed by
the Ottoman Empire (representing an earlier ver-
sion of Islamic fundamentalism), and by the ex-
panding Habsburg and Russian Empires, the
peoples of Central Europe remained closely
linked to western European intellectual and po-
litical thought. (The Reformation as well as the
Enlightenment and the three great democratic
revolutions made a strong impact on them.) By
the 18th century the Habsburg Monarchy - with
considerable military support from the rest of
Europe - pushed back the Ottomans and then for
two centuries kept regional peace. (The British
Foreign Secretary, Lord Palmerston declared in
1849 in the British House of Commons that "The
political independence and liberties of Europe are
bound up ...with the maintenance and integrity of
Austria as a great European Power.")? That great
..
88
power gradually abandoned its German and im-
perialistic character and its eleven constituent
national groups were able to assume increasing
responsibility for running their own affairs, po-
litically some and in the cultural and religious
sphere practically all. It was a large common mar-
ket, with benefits to all the inhabitants. The
splendour of that golden age, the 19th and early
20th century, is still visible, and its cultural
achievements have made their mark all over the
world. Then came the Great War, the great folly,
and it shattered not only what by then was known
as the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, but also the
great hopes about the 20th century. The break-
up of the Monarchy might have been unavoidable,
but not the ensuing instability.
(In October 1918 Leo Amery, then an ad-
viser to the British Prime Minister, with remark-
able foresight, spoke out against the division of
Central Europe into small states.)
"Permanent stability and prosperity could best
be secured by a new Danubian Confederation com-
prising GennanAustria, Bohemia, Hungary, Yugo-
slavia, Romania and probably also Bulgaria. (...)
The various nationalities of Central Europe are so
interlocked, and their racial frontiers are so unsuit-
able as the frontiers of really independent sovereign
states, that the only satisfactory and permanent
working policy for them lies in their incorporation
in a non-national superstate. We can delay, but we
cannot prevent the eventual coming of that super-
state. To commit ourselves unreservedly to nation-
alism at the Peace Conference, and to ignore the
inevitable coming of the larger non-national super-
state, would be to commit precisely the errors which
our grandfathers committed at the Congress of
Vienna, when they settled Europe on the basis of
legitimism, on which the war had been fought and
argued, and not on the basis of the new nationalist
forces which the war had called into being. ''3
The United States, and President Wilson
personally, meant well by proclaiming the doctrine
of national self-determination, but fewwere aware
of the difficulties involved. Responsibility for the
faulty execution of a fair principle lies mainly with
the victorious European powers, but the appetite
of the beneficiaries of the 1919 peace settlement
and the policies pursued by the governments in
the new Central Europe also contributed to the
sad developments that came.) "In each ofthe new
states there prevailed a narrow official national-
ism", and the repressive policies pursued towards
the large national minorities led to internal and
external tensions and conflicts. "This state of gen-
eralized and mutual hostility provided opportu-
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nities for any great power intent on disturbing the
peace.:" For the blunders of the greater and
smaller powers of Europe the whole world paid a
very heavy price, but the Central and Eastern
Europeans suffered incomparingly more and
longer. Having been occupied, conquered and
decimated by Nazi Germany, they were "liber-
ated" by the Soviet Red Army, and as a result the
easternmost part ofthe West came under an Asi-
atic-type despotic rule. With Hitler's and Stalin's
aggressions western institutions and values re-
ceded to the Atlantic countries and the very ex-
istence ofwestern civilizationbecame jeopardized,
while the markets and the resources of Central
Europe became cut off from the rest of the world
for almost half a century.
Shrewd politicians, like Bismarck and
Stalin, were always aware of the strategic impor-
tance of the geographical center of the European
continent, but the destruction of Central Europe
by two world wars almost obliterated the notion
of this important region from the minds. Most
people came to believe that there was only a west-
ern and an eastern Europe, and academic institu-
tions and programs reinforced the results of So-
viet conquest by using the term "Slavic studies",
Russian and East European programs". In this
way well over 150 million non-Russians were al-
most overlooked. This was not a small oversight.
Perhaps some people did not mind that.
They tended to associate Central Europe with the
powder-keg of the Balkans, and remembered only
that twoworld wars broke out there. In the United
States, but also in France and Britain, there were
quite a few people ready to write off the quarrel-
some small states livingbetween the Germans and
the Russians, first to Nazi Germany, then to
Stalin's Russia. Unfortunately Churchill's advice
to save Central Europe, in the 1930's by abandon-
ing the policy of appeasing Hitler, during the war
by liberating Central Europe from the south, push-
ing through "the soft underbelly" and thus fore-
stalling the Red Army, was not heeded to. Ameri-
can thinking in 1943-45 was guided by other con-
siderations: in order to ensure future Soviet co-
operation (in the war against Japan and also later)
Central Europe should be accepted as falling out-
side the western and inside the Soviet sphere of
interest. Its nations should be left to their own
device and encouraged to find an accommodation
with the Soviet Union. It was only hope that a kind
of neutrality, rather than full Sovietization, would
be permitted by Stalin.' That option materialized
only in the case of Finland.
In the late 1940's it was not for the first and
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neither the last time that the Central Europeans
felt themselves let down. Poles will always remem-
ber the four partitions, the Ungarians the 1920
peace treaty and the Czech Munich. It also came
as a surprise for these nations that they were allo-
wed to fall under soviet domination after 1945. In
a most painful and tragic way the notion of being
abandoned revived in 1956, 1968, and 1981respec-
tively. True, all over the world there was strong
and genuine sympathy shown for Hungary, Cze-
choslovakia and Poland in their dramatic attempts
to change the system imposed on them, and there
was even a desire to help, but it appeared to be
too dangerous to go beyond protests and tears.
The military division of 1945 was accepted as a
practically permanent political one, only further
Soviet expansion was to be met by force. It was
only hope that oppression in Central and Eastern
Europe would eventually weaken, that increased
political and economic contacts would change the
Communist leaders to become more amenable,
but "liberation" and "rollback" were only catch-
words, never meant seriously. The 1975 Helsinki
Final Act gave a seal of approval to the division
Europe, although giving it "a human face".
Despite all that there was no feeling of se-
rious resentment towards the West in Central and
Eastern Europe during the Cold War. People
looked at NATO and increasingly at the nations
of Western Europe as the ultimate hope that free-
dom would return and prosperity would set in one
day in the East, too.
Some lessons of the transformation process
1989 was truly an annus mirabilis, the year
of the miracles, when in the wake of the political
transformation of Poland and Hungary, all the
communist dominoes fell, the whole edifice of
communism collapsed and the countries which,
against their expressed will, adopted irrational and
harmful policies restored or introduced demo-
cratic constitutions and started to reestablish the
market economy.
What Central and Eastern Europeans usu-
ally call zthe West', i.e. Western Europe and the
United States, was unprepared for these changes.
This was first pointed out by the late Hungarian
prime Minister J6zsef Antall, who warned at the
Paris CSCE summit of November 1990 that per-
haps the greatest danger for the new Europe lay
in the continued division of the continent with the
one-time Iron Curtain being replaced by a Wel-
fare Wall which would separate the victims of
communism from their more fortunate fellow-
Europeans. Just consider, during the last two
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world wars extensive preparations were made for
the post-war reconstruction, yet none seems to
have been made for the current post-Cold War
reconstruction. Naturally the new non-communist
governments elected in and after 1990 had no
ready plans for managing the transition either.
There was no recipe how to reconstruct the com-
mand economies, how to cure those sick societ-
ies. But if we look around today in Central Eu-
rope, from Warsaw to Zagreb, do we not see how
much this part of Europe has changed for the bet-
ter? Politically certainly, economically it is on the
right track but far from making the good results
available for everyone, for the masses, for those
who - so far - have not benefited from the trans-
formation. And the spiritual, the mental transfor-
mation, the restoration of some basic character-
istics of Central Europe like honesty, the old work
ethics, the incorruptible civil service, a liking for
having an easy time accompanied by compassion
and solidarity is unfortunately very far. Neverthe-
less the governments, [he intellectuals who took
over after 1990 must have done a better job than
it was immediately perceived by many of their
electors. But instead of assessing the performance
of the governments in Central Europe let me
make some comments on the performance of our
friends in the old established democracies.
Once, at a meeting of NACC in Brussels, I
said that having pulled down the Iron Curtain we,
the former "captive nations" found ourselves as
the hero of the book, "The spy who came in from
the cold". He was given a hero's welcome - but
then the air started to cool down around him. He
had been too long out in the cold to fit into the
cosy free world. There was the smell of poverty
and irrational passions around the people living
in Central and Eastern Europe. There was genu-
ine sympathy towards these people but letting
them in, into the club of the rich and the edu-
cated, looked too risky.
Apart from the costs there was also a psy-
chological deterrent which made our western
friends very cautious and often despondent about
the so-called new democracies: the events in the
former Yugoslavia and the fear that there are many
more potential Bosnias. In that conenction I would
like to share with you a few historical and personal
observations on the international handling of the
most terrible crisis since World War 2.
a. Turning a blind eye to the dark side of Tito's
Yugoslavia
Following the break between Stalin and
Tito the United States and her allies gave very
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substantial economic and military support to Yu-
goslavia - for perfectly valid reasons. But in the
followingdecades western countries turned a blind
eye to the gross violations of human rights in Yu-
goslavia, and were apparently unaware of the
growing resentment felt by the non-Serbs towards
the political and economic domination of the
country by Serbs calling themselves Yugoslav in-
ternationalists.
b. Related recognition of the heterogeneous na-
tional-religious composition
The desire to keep Yugoslavia united (and
also memories of Serbia as an ally in two world
wars) made most members of NATO and the
European Community reluctant to accept the idea
of substantial changes in the political geography.
We all remember when the American Secretary
of State in June 1991 still spoke out in favour of a
"unitary Yugoslavia". That undoubtedly encour-
aged the Yugoslav Army to try forestalling the
assertion of independence by Slovenia and
Croatia. When I told James Baker at the CSCE
Foreign Ministerial conference in Berlin that the
debate between Belgrade and the constituent re-
publics might be compared to when thirteen En-
glish colonies in 18th century North America
spoke out for their specific interests he did not
see the parallel.
When violence erupted and already serious
war crimes were committed the European Com-
munity came up with an admirable plan for a new
constitutional arrangement, the so-called
Carrington Plan: special status for all national
communities in the old Yugoslavia, for the Serbs
in Croatia and the non-Serbs (Albanians, Hun-
garians, Croats) in Serbia, while preserving the
economic and monetary union of a confederal
Yugoslavia. Unfortunately the Belgrade leader-
ship was not interested in a fair, peaceful solu-
tion, and the European Community proved too
weak to insist upon the settlement proposed by
itself.
c. Illusion of a political as opposed to a military
solution
Contrary to the often repeated line that
there was no military solution to the crisis, only a
political one, it should have been realized that
once the war started and unbelievable crimes were
committed there was no political solution with-
out the use of some force. But it was only in 1994
that the British weekly Spectator became fed up
with the endless talks about the "peace process"
and wrote: "What we need is a war process." For
too long history was misunderstood, opinion mak-
ers drew up false analogies of World War 2 and
I
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of Vietnam, and there was a misplaced fear of
Germany and a possible new German zone of in-
fluence. The fire was not put out when it was still
a small one. No wonder that soon it spread over
to Bosnia.
d. Moral failure over Croatia, over war crimes
When the war started to rage in Croatia,
with appalling crimes, violations of basic human
rights, and total disregard to the law of war, there
was very little publicity given to that aspect be-
fore the spectacular siege of Dubrovnik started.
There was only one lonely voice: the Visegrad
countries jointly called for action already in Oc-
tober 1991, at their summit meeting in Cracow.
Probably that should have been the time for
NATO to act, on behalf of the UN.
e. Policies smacking of appeasement
Instead of timely and resolute action the
leaders of Europe were trying to satisfy the appe-
tite of the aggressors in the hope that they would
calm down, would stop the atrocities. The world
saw endless talks, ceasefires (to be broken imme-
diately), gradual recognition of war criminals as
negotiating partners, even as "presidents" of non-
existing states. No wonder that NATO was seen
as a paper-tiger, and the UN simply as a useful
source of supply for feeding the soldiers, includ-
ing the paramilitary criminals distinguishing them-
selves in ethnic cleansing and mass rape.
A personal note: some efforts in preventive
diplomacy
Hungary as a neighbouring country, with
close to half a million Hungarians living in the
old Yugoslavia, had a strong interest to prevent
and later to stop violence, also to see a solution
or the peaceful co-existence of various ethnic/re-
ligious groups living side-by-side. Prime Minister
Antall and myself made many suggestions inword
and inwriting to all the interested parties and lead-
ers, supporting the solutions proposed by the
European Community, urging "the effective co-
operation of the international community"," and
drawing attention to the likely consequences, like
adding an Islamic or Slavic solidarity dimension
to the crisis.We constantly warned about the wider
implications, too. "In case the international com-
munity is unable to facilitate the democratic so-
lution of the recent crisis it would send a negative
message for the nations of Central and Eastern
Europe, which liberated themselves and restored
democracy, or at least move towards it. At the
same time such a failure would give encourage-
ment to the supporters of the old, totalitarian re-
gime, who still exist. it is also obvious that the situ-
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situation in Yugoslavia has a decisive impact on
the outcome of the ongoing transition in the So-
viet nuclear superpower. Therefore Yugoslavia is
likely to serve as a precedent, it will show whether
international cooperation can or cannot solve such
a crisis."?
The Hungarian political leadership was con-
cerned not only with the security of its own coun-
try (then under serious threat from the ongoing
war along the southern border) and the future of
the Hungarian communities in Yugoslavia, but
also with the danger of the conflict spreading to
Bosnia-Herzegovina. Before that happened, in a
letter sent in December 1991 to several highly-
placed people involved in trying to find a settle-
ment, I wrote the following: "The UN should im-
mediately try to send peace-keeping forces not
only to the territory of Croatia but also to those
areas of Yugoslavia where there is still a fragile
peace: to Bosnia and to the two formerly autono-
mous provinces, Vojvodina and Kosovo. Without
that a wholesale massacre may occur, as reports
confirrn.:"
Wasn't there a kind of appeasement? Sanc-
tions, let alone peace-making military measures
were not even thought of by western politicians
(as opposed to the military) before the summer
of 1992, almost a year after the outbreak of hos-
tilities. By that time intervention became far more
difficult, and the costs of action looked too high
for western governments to consider seriously. It
also took a long time for the public to change their
opinion about Serbian policy. Many consider-
ations and pretexts were found against action, just
like in the 1930s. But the problem did not simply
go away, and eventually some action had to be
taken. A considerable UN force was sent in and a
massive humanitarian aid program was launched,
but UNPROFOR received a very narrow man-
date. In that way they could only act as observers,
had to suffer humiliation and accept that much of
the aid sent went into the hands of the armies,
thus helping them to continue that most barba-
rous war.
Appeasement always wets the appetite of
the aggressors and so it happened with the viola-
tors of the CSCE norms, principles and recom-
mendations. I am afraid later events justified my
appeal written to a colleague of mine: "It is not
too much to say that the success of the whole tran-
sition process in Central and Eastern Europe is
endangered if the war in the former Yugoslavia is
not finished in the nearest future. The way in
which the international community reacts to this
crisis and demonstrates its capacity and readiness
_0
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to act may set a crucial precedent for the future.
It is therefore vital for the relevant international
fora to yield tangible results, otherwise the inter-
national community would send an extremely
equivocal and wrong message to other over-zeal-
ous nationalists and fomenters of unrest around
the world."?
Almost four years were wasted before
NATO, led by the United States, had enough of
the humiliations and proved that it was far from
being a paper tiger. The aggressors immediately
understood that language and a diplomatic solu-
tion, the Dayton Accord, could become possible.
Central Europe and Euro-Atlantic Integration
There is no denying that western govern-
ments showed much goodwill and sympathy, but
with hindsight it is hard to explain why they reac-
ted so slowlyand cautiously both to the new oppor-
tunities and the dangers. It took more than three
years for the European Community to adopt the
position, at the June 1993 summit in Copenhagen,
that it was willing to admit the former command
economy countries as members - once they were
fit for that. Self-interest, to use the considerable
skills and the lower wages of the Central and East-
ern Europeans in world wide competition should
have also dictated expansion to the European
Union, but fear of the costs and concern with the
immediate problems kept Brussels and the ma-
jority of the twelve governments less than enthu-
siastic about considering their application. It re-
quired a strong diplomatic offensive from Hun-
gary, starting in 1993 and later joined by Poland
to convince the Twelve that we are right to sub-
mit an application for membership. Once that was
accepted and I presented our application on 1
April 1994it was ensured that when the IGS would
be over talks would start with the formerly Com-
munist-dominated countries. Of course there is
more than economic considerations which should
tell in favour of expanding the frontiers of pros-
perity and stability eastward. Security both for the
western and for the eastern half of Europe re-
quires that the present vacuum in the heart of
Europe should be filled. That involves gradually
admitting the ex-Communist countries into the
WEU and primarily into NATO.
The countries of Central and Eastern Eu-
rope want to become members of the Atlantic
Alliance in order to be secure from the traditional
and new threats, in order to make the changes
really irreversible. Their admission would greatly
contribute to the stability of the whole continent,
including that of Russia. Russian arguments about
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expansion being a threat to Russia or at least seen
by its people as such is insincere. The argument
must be reversed: the expansion of the area of
stability and security to Central Europe will make
the Western border zone of Russia stable and safe.
That would enable Russia to deal with the real
threats to its security, which appear to exist rather
in the South and the East. A stable and eventu-
ally prosperous Central Europe will be also very
advantageous for the countries east of it as it will
improve their chances for following suit quickly.
It will encourage the democratic forces of Russia
and Ukraine because Central Europe has long
been seen by them as a testing ground, as a model
within reach. Today - as a recent survey shows'? -
the majority of Russians do not consider them-
selves and their country as part of Europe. If the
real Europe, the institutionalized one, moves
closer to them, they are more likely to discover
the advantages of partnership than while their iso-
lation continues. Today there is a de facto cordon
sanitaire between Russia and the West. Is it in
the interest of anyone that it would remain there?
Once there was a westward moving Fron-
tier in America which greatly contributed to the
consolidation and prosperity of a continent. To-
day there is a kind of eastward moving frontier in
Europe, and that can help solving many of the
problems of the present and the future. That new
frontier must be helped to move quickly, not re-
strained. The process of enlarging western insti-
tutions could have, should have started long ago.
The democracies and the democrats of Central
and Eastern Europe are the friends and support-
ers of democracy in Russia. They can support the
latter best by their own rapid success, but that re-
quires adequate policies by the western world.
NATO has proved to be an excellent edu-
cational institution in bringing together countries
with a long tradition of mutual suspicions and even
conflicts. A similar role is badly needed in Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe. Left alone those states,
without guidance and help, might again end up
not simply in petty quarrels, but being reincorpo-
rated in a new sphere of influence, even in a re-
stored military bloc. Plans for such have obviously
not died yet, and that must be the real explana-
tion for the growing opposition shown by Russia
to its former satellites acceding to the Washing-
ton Treaty. The former members of the Soviet
bloc cannot help seeing that opposition as a most
serious challenge to their sovereignty. it should
not be answered by a policy which shows elements
of appeasement.
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Democracy, human and minority rights, sta-
bility and prosperity are interdependent. They can
spread eastward only gradually. First it is the heart
of Europe which is to be cured. When the new
eastern frontier zone of stability and prosperity
will pass Central Europe to reach Kiev and Mos-
cow, then the centre of Europe will be able to capi-
talize on its geographical position. This is the pre-
condition for Europe to compete successfullywith
the rapidly growing economies of Asia. Only a
Europe united with itself and in close alliance with
the United States can continue and fulfil its mis-
sion, what a Hungarian author once described as
proving that "reason and solidarity is mightier
than the terror of passions". It is only in this way
that we can deal successfully with such interna-
tional problems like the threat of fundamentalist
intolerance, backwardness and aggressive nation-
alism in the East and anarchy, poverty, famine,
disease in the South. By restoring Central Europe
and linking it to the Euro-Atlantic community we
will have a much better chance to deal success-
fully with global problems, like the reckless pol-
lution of the environment, population growth,
unemployment, drugs, crime, terrorism. That is
the way to utilize the results of annus mirabilis
1989, so that the 21st century could be better than
the 20th was. •
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